

Water purification plant, Zaire.



Warfighting and Peace Ops: Do Real Soldiers Do MOOTW?

By RICHARD J. RINALDO

DOD (R.D. Ward)

One major challenge facing the development of doctrine for peace operations is the tension between the principles of war and military operations other than war (MOOTW). This difficulty was addressed by the Army in Field Manual 100-23, *Peace Operations*, a capstone manual which states that the principles of war should not be overlooked in planning peace operations because the possibility of combat does exist, especially in peace enforcement. Joint doctrine more specifically pronounces that the principles of war "generally apply to MOOTW." In addition, the approach to training for such operations found in joint and service doctrine stands on a pillar of training for war that allows commanders to adjust to operational conditions, including peace operations.

Moreover, doctrine does not deal with the planning process for MOOTW any differently than it does for war. Nonetheless doctrine highlights differences between warfighting and peace operations by focusing on the application of the principles of MOOTW in peace operations.¹

Doing MOOTW

Recent though not unprecedent use of the Armed Forces in disaster relief, humanitarian assistance, and peace operations has offered insights into conducting war on a complex battlefield of the future. Military operations in the information age are likely to encounter close scrutiny while ethnic friction, refugee populations, and non-governmental and nonmilitary agencies continue to come into play. Enemies may be transnational criminal gangs or rogue actors instead of organized military formations. Such considerations must be fully incorporated in the mainstream of doctrine rather than being relegated into some new category of military operations.

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Report Documentation Page			<i>Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188</i>	
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1. REPORT DATE 1997	2. REPORT TYPE	3. DATES COVERED 00-00-1996 to 00-00-1997		
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Warfighting and Peace Ops: Do Real Soldiers Do MOOTW?			5a. CONTRACT NUMBER	
			5b. GRANT NUMBER	
			5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER	
6. AUTHOR(S)			5d. PROJECT NUMBER	
			5e. TASK NUMBER	
			5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) National Defense University, Institute for National Strategic Studies, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, DC, 20319			8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)			10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)	
			11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution unlimited				
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES				
14. ABSTRACT				
15. SUBJECT TERMS				
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT Same as Report (SAR)	18. NUMBER OF PAGES 6
a. REPORT unclassified	b. ABSTRACT unclassified	c. THIS PAGE unclassified	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON	

The *Report of the Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces* expressed similar reservations about setting off such operations in a separate category because it “ignores the full range of approaches to resolving conflicts by assuming that military forces exist only to ‘fight and win the Nation’s wars.’” Warfare is not necessarily a worst-case anomaly that necessitates radically different overarching doctrine than that required for peace operations, disaster relief, or humanitarian assistance operations. This point should be weighed in developing the next iteration of Joint Pub 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*, a keystone of the joint doctrine hierarchy. Distinctive aspects of some operations could still be covered in separate publications. Overarching doctrine—basic guidelines for military operations—would then become uniform. Joint Pub 3-07, *Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other than War*, would be rescinded and

not replaced, any separate principles of MOOTW would vanish, and the principles of war would be applied in every operation with the required judgment and skill.

Some, especially those who worked to get recognition for MOOTW, would argue that this approach suggests a return to a past when missions such as peacekeeping were viewed as “non-traditional” and outside the realm of military concerns. By contrast, the “traditionalists” might see it as watering down warfighting. “Real soldiers don’t do MOOTW” could be their battle cry. But this point is moot, given that peacetime engagement and conflict prevention are components of national military strategy. These components subsume most operations now known as MOOTW, as does *Joint Vision 2010*, which portrays a military that is “persuasive in peace, decisive in war, and preeminent in any form of conflict.”

Waging Peace

In 1992, two well-known defense analysts argued that “Yugoslavia and Somalia, as well as the Haitian refugee problem, are unmistakable indicators that the U.S. military will likely be much more engaged in the future in waging peace.” They affirmed a need to overcome the reluctance of the services to prepare for such operations and criticized claims made by some senior officers “that such missions are ‘nonmilitary’ or that they taint the ‘warrior ethic.’”²



U.S. Army (Kevin Thomas)

Hurricane Andrew,
Miami.



Uphold Democracy,
Haiti.



U.S. Navy (Robert Scroggins)

Such claims can be dismissed as part of the Vietnam legacy—emotional arguments against becoming entangled in protracted wars and internal conflicts. To be sure, this concern is rooted in an isolationist streak in our national psyche that comes up whenever our forces, notwithstanding their all-volunteer status, are involved overseas. One example was the reaction to the emergency deployment readiness exercise in Honduras following the Sandanista incursion into that country in March 1988. Protests reminiscent of the 1960s appeared almost instantly. Similar objections were raised in the case of Bosnia. This concern may be driven by the demographics of post-industrial societies which have smaller families. Contrasted with social conditions in the past when larger families were the norm, one pundit has concluded that “the loss of a youngster in combat, however tragic, was therefore fundamentally less unbearable.”³

The fear is that U.S. involvement in such conflicts will generate unacceptable casualties and

turn into quagmires. Policymakers think that long-term commitments and mounting casualties sap resolve

on the home front.

Many who experienced or have studied the Vietnam War would agree. Senior military leaders who served in that conflict remember its impact on morale. All these factors figured in analyses of the military profession in the 1970s and 1980s, as did subsequent disasters such as Desert One, the hostage rescue operation in Iran, and the Marine deployment to Lebanon.

Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger expressed his well known views on this subject in a speech before the National Press Club in 1984 which posed criteria for applying military power. Among them are support of public and Congress, a threat to vital national interests, clear political and military objectives, and exhaustion of all nonmilitary options. Weinberger insisted these tests “are intended to sound a note of caution—caution that we must observe prior to committing forces to combat overseas.”⁴ He had studied the post-war period and realized that “gray area conflicts,” small clashes short of total war, would be the source of threats to national interests in the future.

A few years earlier the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) started work on a host of operational concepts. As preliminary ideas about warfighting, they were indicators of a search for new doctrine.⁵ Prophetically, one paper issued at this time declared that peacekeeping was a legitimate area of military study.⁶ It also debated

moving toward transnational and pan-national forces. A decade later Russians are deployed in Bosnia with the U.S. contingent in the Stabilization Force and the U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute is active at the U.S. Army War College.

Publication of the *Joint Low-Intensity Conflict Project Report* by TRADOC in 1986 was key to recognizing new ways to cope with a new era. TRADOC also had joined with Tactical Air Command to establish the Army-Air Force Center for Low-Intensity Conflict (CLIC). Moreover, the small wars operational research directorate was set up at U.S. Southern Command. TRADOC also had formed the low-intensity conflict cell in the Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth. Congress enacted legislation that established the post of assistant secretary of defense for special operations and low-intensity conflict and the U.S. Special Operations Command. More recently, deputy assistant secretaries for peacekeeping and peace enforcement policy and for humanitarian and refugee affairs have been named within DOD.


From this doctrinal and organizational activity emerged highly mobile, tailored forces that are capable of being deployed anywhere and anytime. At the same time LIC-MOOTW imperatives have been introduced into doctrine, training, and readiness. Presidential decision directive 25 on reform of multinational peace operations, issued in May 1994, refined results of a review begun in the Bush administration by extending and modifying the Weinberger criteria as factors to consider in specific cases when national power is applied in peace operations.

The military proved itself in Just Cause and Desert Storm. Yet these successes as well as some aspects of operations in Somalia and Bosnia have tended to reinforce the Vietnam syndrome or, as one former official characterized this phenomenon, the “Vietnamia syndrome.”⁷ A corollary that calls for furthering our national interests by the use of decisive force also has been resurrected. Advocates of the latter approach are not engaged in foolishness, and their perspective should not be disregarded.

Whatever judgments have been reached on this subject, doctrine has not been silent about MOOTW, especially of late. Early work describing guidelines for limited wars and LIC are related and were important milestones in bringing attention to doctrine. Building on the rich experience of the military, guidance on LIC and the broader concept of MOOTW abound. In fact, a proliferation of doctrinal pubs on specific operations and related concerns, such as interagency and multinational coordination, is another indicator that we can go beyond the global categorization of MOOTW for the purposes of broad keystone doctrinal guidance.

peacetime engagement and conflict prevention are components of national military strategy

Combined U.S.-Russian patrol in Zvornic, Bosnia-Herzegovina.



55th Signal Company, Combat Camera (Glenn W. Suggs)

Less extensive but no less confident than this doctrine are the critiques of it. One criticism is that creating a category of “conflict as a strategic environment distinct from war or peacetime [in terms of Army doctrine] is especially problematic. . . . Wasn’t World War II a conflict? Is conflict war? Is conflict an operation other than war? Is conflict peace?”⁸ Such categorization may reveal what another critic described as “mild schizophrenia about the nature of war” in general.⁹

Finding a Solution

The flawed distinction between the principles of war and those of MOOTW tends to inspire independence when interdependence exists and divergence where there is unity. Put more subtly, MOOTW may involve combat and require attention to the principles of war. But that commanders must apply two sets of principles in MOOTW which involve combat may be unnecessary.

A comparison of the principles of war and those of MOOTW (see the accompanying figure) in view of the proposition that the distinction between them is unnecessary and that the principles of MOOTW are superfluous is instructive. At first blush the comparison seems simple because the principles of objective and security are found under both categories. Unity of effort is also closely related to unity of command and may be regarded as a subset peculiar not only to MOOTW

but also to other multinational and interagency operations. In such operations command arrangements are subject to a range of considerations that speak to its utility. Alternatively, one can discuss unity of effort as germane to the objective. Military forces further the objective by generating the ways and means to achieve it. However, as FM 100-23 indicates, although unity of effort is fundamental to coordinating with both governmental and nongovernmental agencies in MOOTW,

Comparing War and MOOTW

Principles of War	Principles of MOOTW
■ Objective	■ Objective
■ Offensive	■ Unity of Effort
■ Simplicity	■ Legitimacy
■ Mass	■ Perseverance
■ Maneuver	■ Restraint
■ Security	■ Security
■ Surprise	
■ Unity of Command	
■ Economy of Force	

the requirement to exercise unity of command within the military structure is not rescinded.

But what about those principles said to be new or unique to MOOTW? Is restraint any less critical in war? Is it related to the objective vis-à-vis post-conflict considerations? Does economy of force have clear application to MOOTW since

there is a requirement for the judicious application of all force? Is restraint an aspect of economy of force in that sense? At the

surprise can deter violations of the peace operations mandate, especially with displays of power

same time economy of force and security validate the value of tempering restraint with the imperative and nonnegotiable right of forces to protect themselves.

Is perseverance a separate fundamental geared only to peace operations or other MOOTW? Will commanders always need to balance their operational and tactical preference for results, using decisive force, with sensitivity for long-term strategic aims of a mission or mandate? Perseverance includes acknowledging both the constraints and opportunities of time and other resources. It also considers long-term goals and post-conflict endstates. It may also take the form of planning for the transition and termination of a military role and for continued appropriate support as other agencies assume major responsibilities. Paradoxically a notion of perseverance may contribute to avoidance of mission creep through early involvement of other agencies in planning.

And is the use of decisive force only overwhelming in the sense of its relation to specific circumstances for its use? Are decisive results a product of such use? General Colin Powell, then the Chairman, directly addressed this point in a 1993 speech:

Decisive doesn't mean overwhelming. Decisive means decisive. It means committing the force needed to achieve the political objective. If the political objective is very circumscribed, the force should still be decisive in order to achieve that limited objective.¹⁰

Powell's response also calls attention to the principles of economy of force and restraint. Because political constraints can limit the type and number of forces available to commanders, economy of force may be even more relevant in MOOTW. Likewise restraint in such circumstances translates into a limited use of force commensurate with the goals of the operation. Allied airpower used in Bosnia in 1995 to coerce compliance with U.N. mandates was another example of an effective use of force where the duration and targeting was strictly commensurate with limited goals—far short of the capability NATO could muster and sustain in a full-scale war.

The request for help from the Philippines when its government was threatened by a coup in 1989 highlights another dimension of the principle of legitimacy in MOOTW—the perception of an operation in the international or regional arena. Is legitimacy a principle that applies exclusively to MOOTW? Is it any less important in peacekeeping than war? Is it another aspect of the objective? Must the objective of a war be equally legitimate as a peace operation in the eyes of both American and foreign publics, and in many cases the public of affected nations? Can U.S. troops fight well in a bad fight? Was Just Cause so called as a public relations ploy or was it a clue to the real needs of conducting war? International legal scholars would no doubt maintain the requirements for both *jus ad bellum* (laws governing going to war) and *jus in bello* (laws governing the conduct of war). Legitimacy is nothing new.

In another recent MOOTW, Support Hope in Rwanda, the principal objective—to stop the dying—was facilitated by the principle of mass: providing clean water and water purification units. Likewise, during humanitarian assistance after Hurricane Andrew, mass—the rapid deployment of some 4,000 troops—was applicable to assuring victims of the government's commitment to help. There was also an element of surprise involved in these actions. And certainly in Haiti a credible threat of a massive U.S. assault and forced entry, which was almost executed, deterred opposition and precluded combat. Did this threat also serve as an element of surprise during the negotiations? As the current chief of staff of the Army noted, “Nothing helps focus the mind faster than knowing that the 82nd Airborne is en route and has a one way ticket to your location.”¹¹

Maneuver, with its focus on achieving a relative advantage over an enemy, could be part of a larger fundamental of all operations, gaining situational dominance or control no matter what the mission. Isn't military force inherently based upon discipline, organization, and capabilities—and ultimately the ability to exercise such dominance across the full range of operations?

Is the principle of the offensive thus also an aspect of such control and dominance since it is necessary to achieve decisive results and freedom of action? Does mass fit into this construct of control? The use of extensive economic aid, humanitarian assistance, or related initiatives could also serve to exert control and foster favorable outcomes.

Is surprise a means to shift a balance of factors in one's favor? It is, of course, problematic in many peace operations, especially in peacekeeping where transparency is the rule. Nevertheless it applies, for example, in retaining the ability to establish a mobile element of combat power that can immediately be deployed to points of con-



Just Cause, Panama.

fundamental guidelines for conducting military operations. They relate to the full range of operations. There is no need to view them in isolation from or in addition to principles of MOOTW. Peace and war are interrelated and inform one another. The simultaneous application of all the instruments of national or international power will increase the impact of U.S. involvement. Differences, especially when complementary, can enhance this relationship. Real soldiers do MOOTW—not just wars. **JFQ**

NOTES

¹ This article is based in part on discussion at a conference sponsored by the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command on April 11–12, 1995. For an account of this event, see *Summary Report of a Conference on Operations Other Than War* (Cambridge, Mass.: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Inc., 1995).

² Don M. Snider and William J. Taylor, "Needed—A Pentagon Prepared to Wage Peace," in *The Washington Post*, August 9, 1992, p. C-1.

³ Edward N. Luttwak, "Toward Post-Heroic Warfare," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 74, no. 3 (May/June 1995), p. 115.

⁴ Caspar W. Weinberger, "The Uses of Military Power," news release no. 609-84 (Washington: Office of the Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, November 28, 1984).

⁵ See John L. Romjue, *From Active Defense to AirLand Battle: The Development of Army Doctrine, 1973-1982* (Fort Monroe, Virginia: Historical Office, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, 1984), p. 44.

⁶ William H. Zierdt III, "The First Earth Battalion Embryos: Let's Study Peacekeeping Forces" (Fort Monroe, Virginia: U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, n.d.)

⁷ Richard Holbrooke quoted by Elaine Sciolino in "Soldiering on, Without an Enemy," *The New York Times*, October 29, 1995, p. IV-1.

⁸ David A. Fastabend, "Checking the Doctrinal Map: Can We Get There from Here with FM-100-5," *Parameters*, vol. 25, no. 2 (Summer 1995), p. 42.

⁹ Robert Killebrew, "Why War is Still War," *Armed Forces Journal International* (January 1995), p. 37.

¹⁰ Colin L. Powell in Stephen Daggett and Nina Serafino, *The Use of Force: Key Contemporary Documents* (Washington: Congressional Research Service, 1994), pp. 9-15..

¹¹ Dennis J. Reimer, "The Army of the 21st Century," in an address presented at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy in Medford, Massachusetts, on November 17, 1995.

tention to control or influence events. Surprise in this context is related to massing forces or effects. Similarly surprise can be a factor in other displays of resolve or commitment to the purpose of peace operations. Examples are the use of unexpected aerial searchlights, bursts of artillery smoke, or illumination rounds to inform belligerent parties that the peace operations force is aware of prohibited activities. Surprise can deter violations of the peace operation mandate, especially with appropriate displays of credible power. Even unexpected but overt displays of such power in training may discourage unacceptable behavior.

Likewise, surprise is related to maneuver and initiative on all levels of warfare. Presenting strategic or operational level resources simultaneously and quickly and in a surprising way, such as in Haiti, is powerful. Such assets may be inconceivable to an enemy. Surprise can put an enemy off balance before it can react, or convince it that any martial response will be disastrous. In this context surprise should be defined in terms of timing the withholding, protecting, or disclosing of information about intent, resources, or activity to the advantage of national objectives. Just Cause proved that the joint team has the capability to achieve such surprise.

After reviewing the complex relationship between warfighting and peace operations, a blur of activity remains among the political, military, economic, and other elements of national power. In this environment the principles of war remain complete and enduring in providing